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During the Great Recession of 2008–2009, 
real world trade fell by roughly four times the 
decline in real world GDP.1 A common, but 
controversial, view is that cross-border verti-
cal linkages—international trade in intermedi-
ate goods—played a key role in the decline in 
trade. The purpose of this paper is to provide 
systematic evidence on the importance of these 
linkages. The framework we use draws from 
Johnson and Guillermo Noguera (2010) and 
Bems, Johnson, and Yi (2010); it is a global 
input-output table that links demand to produc-
tion through bilateral, sectoral trade in interme-
diate and final goods. With this framework, we 
perform two exercises.
In our first exercise, we compute the fall in 
final goods trade and in intermediate goods 
trade that arises from the actual decline in final 
demand that occurred between 2008:I and 
2009:I. Surprisingly, we find that the fall in final 
goods trade, 16.9 percent, was more than twice 
as large as the fall in intermediate goods trade, 
7.6 percent. However, because the share of inter-
mediate goods trade in total trade is about two-
thirds, the contribution of intermediate goods to 
the total trade decline is still significant.
In our second exercise, we focus on a subset 
of vertical linkages, those imported intermedi-
ate goods that are embodied in goods that are 
exported (vertical specialization).2 To measure 
vertical specialization, we compute the  difference 
1 Between 2008:I and 2009:I, real world trade fell by 15 
percent, and real world GDP fell by 3.7 percent (source: IMF 
Global Data Source database). 
2 See David Hummels, Jun Ishii, and Yi (2001) and Yi 
(2003). 
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between gross trade and the value-added content 
of trade. We show that vertical specialization 
trade fell by more than value-added trade (12.9 
percent versus 10.3 percent), because declines 
in demand were largest in more vertically spe-
cialized sectors. Nevertheless, because value-
added trade constitutes about three-fourths of 
total trade, the decline in value-added trade still 
accounts for more than two-thirds of the decline 
in total trade.
I. Empirical Framework
We consider a world economy composed of 
N countries and S goods-producing sectors in 
each country. Each country produces a differen-
tiated good within each sector that is either used 
as an intermediate input in production or used 
to satisfy final demand.3 Output in each coun-
try is produced by combining local factor inputs 
with domestic and imported intermediate goods. 
Let the quantity of (gross) output in sector s of 
country i be denoted by  q i (s). Let the quantity 
of intermediates from sector s in country i used 
in production of output in sector t in country j 
be  q ij m (s, t), and the quantity of final goods from 
sector s in country i absorbed in destination j be 
q ij d(s).
With this notation, the market clearing is 
given by  q i (s) =  ∑ j      ∑ t      q ij m (s, t) +  ∑ j      q ij d(s). 
Taking percentage changes across two points in 
time yields
(1)   qi (s) =  ∑ 
j
 
 
  ∑ 
t
 
 
  [  q ij m (s, t) _ q i (s)  ]  qij m (s, t)
 +  ∑ 
j
 
 
  [  q ij d(s) _ q i (s)  ]  qij d(s),
where   x ≡ (( x t −  x t−1 )/ x t−1 ) denotes the per-
centage change in variable x. To translate this into 
an empirical framework for analysis, we need 
3 The definition of final demand here follows the national 
accounts, including private consumption, government pur-
chases, and investment (including inventory changes). 
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measures of quantity shares  q ij m (s, t)/ q i (s) and 
q ij d(s)/ q i (s) for all i, j, s, t. Because we observe 
shipment values computed at a common set of 
prices in our data, we can equate quantity shares 
to value shares. We also need to link changes 
in real bilateral final and intermediate goods 
flows (i.e.,   qij m (s, t) and   qij d(s)) to observables. 
To do this, we assume that production functions 
and consumer preferences are Leontief, which 
implies that   qij 
m (s, t) =   qj (t) and   qij d(s) =   qj d (s).
With these assumptions, we can then re-write 
equation (1) as
(2)   qi (s) =  ∑ 
j
 
 
  ∑ 
t
 
 
  [  m ij (s, t) _ y i (s)  ]  qj (t)
 +  ∑ 
j
 
 
  [  d ij (s) _ y i (s)  ]  qj d (s),
where  m ij (s, t) and  d ij (s) are the value of bilateral 
intermediate and final goods shipments and  y i (s) 
is the value of total production.
Combining the market clearing conditions for 
many countries, we show in Bems, Johnson, and 
Yi (2010) that changes in output are linear com-
binations of changes in final demand:
(3)   qi (s) =  ∑ 
j
 
 
  ∑ 
t
 
 
  s ij (s, t)  qj d (t),
where  s ij (s, t) records the share of output from 
sector s in country i used directly or indirectly to 
produce final goods of sector t that are absorbed 
in country j. These shares depend on the entire 
structure of both final and intermediate goods 
linkages within and across countries.
We then calculate changes in real aggregate 
output and trade using Laspeyres quantity indi-
ces. For example, aggregate real import growth 
is
(4)  ˆ  iM i =  ∑ 
j≠ i
 
    ∑ 
s
 
 
  ∑ 
t
 
 
  [  m ji (s, t) _i m i   ]  qi (t)
 +  ∑ 
j≠ i
 
   ∑ 
s
 
 
  [  d ji (s) _i m i   ]  qi d (s),
where i m i are the value of total exports and 
imports in the base period. Ultimately, aggre-
gate output and trade are linear combinations of 
demand changes in all countries and sectors.
We make two observations about this frame-
work. First, the framework does not admit the 
possibility that global supply chains can be bro-
ken. Hence, this channel of reduced trade is not 
captured. Second, suppose that final demand 
falls by X percent in all sectors and countries. 
Then, output, total trade, final goods trade, and 
intermediate goods trade will also all fall by X 
percent in all sectors and countries. Hence, any 
deviation from a unit elasticity of trade with 
respect to final demand in our framework must 
arise from heterogeneity across sectors or coun-
tries in the size of the demand changes.
To operationalize this framework, we need 
data on bilateral final and intermediate goods 
flows ( m ij (s, t) and  d ij (s)), as well and final 
demand changes (   qi d (s)).4 We combine national 
input-output tables with bilateral trade data from 
the GTAP 7.1 database to measure final and 
intermediate flows.5 As in Johnson and Noguera (2010), we use the bilateral trade data to split 
imported intermediate and final goods across 
bilateral sources, assuming that bilateral sourc-
ing is proportional to bilateral imports at the 
sector level. After splitting the data at the dis-
aggregate level, we aggregate the data to form 
three composite sectors—durable industrial pro-
duction, nondurable industrial production, and a 
composite agriculture and services sector.6 We 
use national accounts data from the IMF Global 
Data Source, the OECD, and national sources to 
compute changes in real demand for the three 
composite sectors. In the end, we have real out-
put, trade, and demand data for 55 countries. We 
examine the time period between 2008:I and 
2009:I.
II. Final versus Intermediate Goods Trade
We first examine the relative importance of final 
and intermediate goods in the decline in trade. A 
key implication of our framework is that trade 
in final goods is closely linked to final demand, 
while trade in intermediate goods is closely linked 
to output. We feed changes in final demand for 
all countries and sectors into our parameterized 
framework; this yields implications for output 
4 See Bems, Johnson, and Yi (2010) for details on the 
procedure described here. 
5 The 2004 benchmark data are assembled by the Global 
Trade Analysis Project at Purdue University. 
6 Durables include sectors 38–42 in the GTAP data, cov-
ering machinery and equipment. Nondurables include all 
other industrial production (sectors 15–37 and 43–45). 
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and trade for all countries and sectors. One impli-
cation is that world trade declines by 11 percent, 
which is close to the actual decline of 15 percent. 
This is a useful diagnostic that indicates that our 
framework is a reasonable one.
Our discussion of the results focuses on impli-
cations for global aggregates. Table 1 presents 
the results for gross output, final goods trade, 
and intermediate goods trade in rows 2, 3, and 
4.7 Column 4 of rows 3 and 4 shows that final 
goods trade falls by 16.9 percent, while interme-
diate goods trade falls by only 7.6 percent. Two 
forces drive this result, both related to durable 
goods. First, column 3 shows that final goods 
trade in durable goods falls by considerably more 
than intermediate goods trade in durable goods (31.2 percent versus 19.4 percent). Second, the 
share of durable goods in final goods trade is both 
large and almost twice that of the share of durable 
goods in intermediate goods trade (48 percent 
versus 26 percent).
Why does final goods trade in durables fall 
by much more than intermediate goods trade in 
durables? We mentioned above that final goods 
trade is tied closely to final demand, while inter-
mediate goods trade is tied closely to gross 
output. Indeed, Table 1 shows that actual final 
demand for durables fell by about 28 percent, 
while gross output of durables fell by about 
19 percent. The answer to the question, then, 
can be found by answering why final demand 
for durables fell by more than gross output of 
durables. The change in gross output of durables 
is a weighted average of the sectoral changes in 
7 See the online Appendix (http://www.aeaweb.org/ 
articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.101.3.308) for algebraic 
details regarding construction of this table. 
final demand (see (3)), because durable goods 
are used as inputs to produce final agriculture, 
services, and nondurable goods. As Table 1 
shows, these categories of goods experienced a 
much smaller decline in final demand than did 
durables. Hence, there is a smaller decline in 
durables gross output than in durables demand.
Finally, we note that, while intermediate 
goods trade declined by less than final goods 
trade, because intermediate goods account for 
63.5 percent of total trade, these goods contrib-
uted 43.9 percent of the fall in total trade.
III. Value Added versus Gross Trade
A second way to assess the role of vertical 
linkages is to focus on the subset of vertical 
linkages known as vertical specialization—
those intermediate goods that are imported 
and are embodied in goods that are exported. 
Vertical specialization is closely related to 
the value-added content of trade. Johnson and 
Noguera (2010) define the value-added content 
of trade (equivalently, value-added exports) as 
the amount of value added produced in a given 
source country that is ultimately embodied in 
final goods absorbed abroad. The value-added 
content of trade is typically a fraction of total 
trade owing to “double counting” in trade 
data. This double counting arises as goods are 
passed back and forth across international bor-
ders through multistage, vertically specialized 
production processes. By comparing changes 
in valued-added trade to changes in gross or 
total trade, we can quantify how vertical spe-
cialization trade changed during the Great 
Recession.
To perform this decomposition, we 
develop an expression for the change in real 
Table 1—Changes in World Final and Intermediate Goods Trade in Global IO Framework
Agriculture and services Nondurables Durables Total
Change ( percent)
Actual final demand:   qd (t)  0.0  − 5.6  − 27.7  − 3.7
Gross output:   q(t)  − 1.6  − 5.2  − 19.4  − 4.6
Final goods trade  0.5  − 6.7  − 31.2  − 16.9
Intermediate goods trade  − 1.1  − 5.6  − 19.4  − 7.6
Actual shares
 In total final goods trade  0.21  0.31  0.48
 In total intermediate goods trade  0.35  0.40  0.26
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 value-added exports for each country. Note 
that growth in real value added for country 
i is   Vi =  ∑ s   ( V A i (s)/V A i )  qi (s), where V A i (s) 
is value added in sector s and V A i =  ∑ s   V A i (s). 
Because output in each sector depends on changes 
in both domestic and foreign demand (as in (3)), 
we can decompose changes in real value added 
into components due to domestic and foreign 
demand changes. The change in real value added 
induced by changes in foreign demand is then 
equal to the change in real value-added exports, 
which we denote  ˆ  VAX i . This is given by
  ˆ  VAX i =  ∑ 
s
 
 
  ∑ 
t
 
 
  ∑ 
j≠i
 
   ( VA X ij (s, t) _VA X i   )  qj d (t),
where VA X ij (s, t) = V A i (s) s ij (s, t). The ratio 
VA X ij (s, t)/VA X i is value added produced by 
sector s in country i absorbed in sector t final 
demand in country j expressed as a share of 
total value added embodied in exports of coun-
try i. This means that the change in value-added 
exports is a weighted average of sectoral final 
demand changes in foreign destinations, where 
the weights reflect the extent to which value 
added from the source country-sector is embod-
ied in final demand in the destination.
Turning to gross exports, the change in 
real gross exports can be written as  ˆ  EX i =  ∑ j≠i     ∑ t   ( d ij (t)/e x i )  q j d (t) + ( m ij (t)/e x i )  qj (t). 
Noting, again, that output changes themselves 
depend on final demand, this can be rewritten as
 ˆ  EX i =  ∑ 
j≠i
 
   ∑ 
t
 
 
  (  d ij (t) _e x i   )  qj d (t)
 +  ∑ 
j≠i
 
   ∑ 
t
 
 
  ∑ 
k
 
 
  ∑ 
u
 
 
  (  m ij (t) _e x i   ) s jk (t, u)  qk d(u).
Comparing (6) to (5), both gross exports and 
value-added exports depend ultimately on 
demand changes. However, the weights dif-
fer across the two types of trade. For example, 
value-added exports depend only on demand 
changes abroad. By contrast, gross exports 
depend on both foreign and domestic demand 
changes, because exported intermediate goods 
can be used to produce foreign goods that are 
ultimately consumed at home. Further, note that 
if demand falls by the same percentage in all 
countries and sectors, then value-added exports 
and gross exports fall by an identical percentage. 
Thus, deviations between value-added exports 
and gross exports are driven entirely by compo-
sition effects in our framework.
For each country, we define “vertical specializ- 
ation trade” as the difference between gross trade 
and trade in value added: V S i = E X i − VA X i . This 
implies  ˆ  VS i = (E X i /V S i ) ˆ  EX i  − (VA X i /V S i ) ˆ  VAX i . 
Then, we can aggregate across countries to gen-
erate world changes in value-added and vertical 
specialization trade. We decompose the results 
by sector, as in the previous section, and then 
aggregate to form world composites. As before, 
we also use the index t to denote the destina-
tion sector, though now this is the destination in 
which output or value added is absorbed in final 
demand, as in (6) and (5).
Table 2 presents the response of total (gross) 
trade, value-added trade, and vertical specializa-
tion trade. Not surprisingly, the largest decline 
in gross trade is due to the change in demand 
for durables. Note, also, that within each sector, 
value-added and vertical specialization trade fall 
by roughly the same percentage.
Column 4 shows that total vertical specializa-
tion trade falls by more than value-added trade 
Table 2—Changes in World Value Added and Vertical Specialization (VS) Trade in Global IO Framework
Agriculture and services Nondurables Durables Total
Change( percent)
Actual final demand:   qd (t)  0.0  − 5.6  − 27.7  − 3.7
Total (gross) trade  0.6  − 6.0  − 29.2  − 11.0
Value-added trade  0.6  − 6.0  − 29.5  − 10.3
Vertical specialization trade  0.7  − 5.8  − 28.6  − 12.9
Actual shares
 In gross trade  0.41  0.26  0.33
 In value added trade  0.42  0.27  0.30
 In vertical specialization trade  0.34  0.25  0.41
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(−12.9 percent versus −10.3 percent). This is 
because vertical specialization trade is more 
heavily concentrated in the durables sector, the 
sector with the largest decline in demand and, 
therefore, trade. Thus, the interaction of a large 
decline in demand centered on the most verti-
cally specialized sector raises the global elas-
ticity of trade with respect to realized demand 
changes. Nevertheless, the difference in declines 
between the two types of trade is not large. The 
overall contribution, in an accounting sense, of 
vertical specialization (VS) trade to the decline 
of total trade is quite significant, 31.6 percent, 
but the contribution exceeds VS’s share of global 
trade, 26.9 percent, by less than five percent-
age points. For individual countries that either 
trade mainly durable goods or have particularly 
intense vertical linkages, this effect is larger. 
For Canada and Mexico, for example, vertical 
specialization exports fall by 17 percent, while 
value added exports fall by 11.7 percent.
IV. Conclusions
Our paper uses a global input-output frame-
work to assess the role of vertical linkages in the 
sharp decline in trade during the Great Recession. 
We give a nuanced interpretation to our find-
ings. Intermediate goods trade fell by consider-
ably less than final goods trade, but, owing to 
its large share in total trade, it still accounted 
for more than two-fifths of the decline in global 
trade. Vertical specialization trade accounted 
for about one-third of the decline in total trade; 
this implies, of course, that value-added trade 
accounted for the bulk of the decline.
The role of durable goods is far less nuanced. 
Three aspects of durable goods stand out. First, 
global durable goods demand fell sharply, close 
to 30 percent. Second, because durable goods 
rely heavily on services for production, our 
framework implies that the fall in durable goods 
output is less than the fall in durable goods de-
mand. Then, because intermediate goods trade 
is tied to (gross) output and final goods trade is 
tied to final demand, our framework yields the 
result that intermediate goods trade falls by less 
than final goods trade. Third, durable goods tend 
to have more vertical specialization than nondu-
rables, services, or agriculture goods. Because 
of this, the contribution of vertical specialization 
in the decline in trade is larger than its share in 
trade.
As mentioned above, our framework does not 
allow for vertical despecialization or “onshor-
ing,” the process by which firms have returned 
some foreign production back home.8 To the 
extent this occurred, this would increase the 
importance of vertical specialization in the trade 
decline. It would also be useful to compare the 
actual trade collapse to a simulated collapse in 
a counterfactual world with less vertical spe-
cialization. Additional work in both these areas 
would be worthwhile.
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